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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we analyse the determinants of disclosure level in the accounting for financial instruments of 
Portuguese listed companies. Considering the mandatory adoption of International Accounting Standards after 
2005, our ultimate objective is to analyse the characteristics of companies that are closest to the requirements of 
IAS 32 and IAS 39. We have constructed an index of disclosure and computed the index score for each 
Portuguese listed company. We tested the relation between the index score and several firm-specific 
characteristics. We argue that the agency, the signalling and the political costs theories do not fully explain 
Portuguese reality, where there is a large degree of family ownership and bank-oriented financing policies. We 
therefore advocate that introducing variables related to specific characteristics of Portuguese companies and 
managers, in the context of other theoretical frameworks, notably the contingency theory, brings important 
insights to this type of analysis. 
 
KEY WORDS: Accounting for financial instruments, Firm-specific characteristics, International Accounting, 
IAS, Portugal 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This research analyses the determinants of disclosure practices in the accounting for financial instruments by 
Portuguese listed companies. Considering the mandatory adoption of International Accounting Standards after 
2005 by listed companies, our ultimate objective is to analyse the characteristics of companies that are closest to 
the disclosure requirements of the International Accounting Standards related to financial instruments – IAS 32 
and IAS 39. 
 
There are several theories that help us to develop hypotheses on the determinants of accounting practices: the 
positive accounting theory (Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) and Watts and Zimmerman (1978)), the 
signalling theory (Ross (1977)), and legitimacy and institutional theory. These theories are the background of 
several accounting studies on determinants of accounting choice and disclosure.  
 
Our main research questions are: 
 
Do theories on disclosure and accounting choice apply to the Portuguese listed companies? 
What are the factors that most influence disclosure practices in Portuguese companies? 
What will 2005 really mean for Portuguese companies? 
 
In order to address these questions, and based on background theories, prior empirical research and the data 
collected by the content analysis of companies’ annual reports, we have developed several hypotheses relating to 
firm-specific characteristics that may explain disclosure practices by companies. 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents previous literature related to the 
determinants of disclosure and compliance. Section 3 provides a brief regulatory background. Section 4 
describes the theoretical background and the development of the hypotheses. In Section 5 the research design is 
explained, which includes a description of the dependent and the independent variables, the sample selection 
process and the sample characteristics. Section 6 gives the main statistical results while Section 7 discusses the 
research results and draws some conclusions.  
 
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) describe the theoretical background to the demand for disclosure (agency conflicts and 
information asymmetry) and review the empirical disclosure literature. They divide it into four categories: the 
role of disclosure regulation in reducing information and agency problems; the effectiveness of auditors and 
information intermediaries; factors affecting decisions by managers on financial reporting and disclosures; and 
the economic consequences of disclosures. The most relevant category to our study is the one that tries to explain 
managers’ decisions, which has two main areas: (1) focusing on managers’ accounting decisions based on the 
positive theory of accounting and (2) focusing on management disclosure decisions (voluntary disclosure 
literature, which is complementary to the first one). 
 
Accounting research on the determinants of disclosure practices and other accounting choices based on firm 
characteristics is a very extensive field. In this literature review, we concentrated on the studies that have 
addressed the International Accounting Standards or the accounting for financial instruments73. We split this 
more specific area of research into two groups of empirical studies: one that is focused on the adoption of IAS in 
which the dependent variable is a dummy variable (type of adopter/non-adopter), and another that tries to 
quantify the extent of compliance with a single (or a group of) standard(s) and analyse its determinants using 
disclosure indices. 
 
The first studies include Cuijpers, Buijink and Maijoor (2002), Ashbaugh (2001), Murphy (1999), El-Gazzar, 
Finn and Jacob (1999) and Dumontier and Raffournier (1998). The second group includes Chalmers and 
Godfrey (2004), Glaum and Street (2003), Street and Bryant (2000), Street and Gray (2001), Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman (2003) and Tower, Hancock and Taplin (1999). This paper falls into the second group of studies, since 
we are developing a disclosure index based on the requirements of IAS 32 and 39. 
 
Table 1 summarises these studies, showing the type of statistical analysis conducted, the explanatory variables 
adopted and the empirical results. 
 
                                                 
73 There are several other studies that, although they have addressed the determinants of disclosure in general (not specifically related to IAS 
or financial instruments), nevertheless bring insights to our research, especially regarding the choice and measurement of explicative and 
dependent variables. We refer to some recent studies: Chen and Jaggi (2000)– Hong Kong; Eng and Mak (2003) - Singapore; Cooke (1989)- 
Sweden, Cooke (1993)- Japan; Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994) – Malaysia; Wallace and Naser (1994)– Spain; Wallace and Naser (1995)– 
Hong Kong; Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse (1990); Frost and Pownall (1994); Gray, Meek and Roberts (1995)– US and UK; Meek 
and Roberts (1995)– US, UK and Continental Europe; Inchausti (1997) – Spain; Raffournier (1995) – Switzerland; Watson, Shrives and 
Marston (2002) - UK. 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) paper is a very extensive literature review, which includes several early accounting studies on the determinants 
(firm’s characteristics) of disclosure. It gives a thorough description of each study with respect to sample country, firms and time period, 
dependent variable(s), independent variables and results. 
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3. REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
 
In this section we describe briefly the accounting for financial instruments rules in Portugal, highlighting the 
main differences relative to IAS 32 and 3974.   
 
Regarding measurement criteria, in non-financial companies, on-balance sheet financial instruments should be 
measured at cost value (or market value if it is lower). Futures contracts used in trading operations are measured 
at fair value. The other off-balance sheet financial instruments are not covered by specific accounting rules. This 
gap is covered by Accounting Directive 18, which establishes compliance with IAS whenever Portuguese 
standards are not available. So, it may be expected that companies are already adopting some IAS requirements 
in their accounting for financial instruments. 
 
In financial companies, fair value should be applied to trading securities and to FRAs, futures, options and swaps 
when used in trading operations. Changes in the fair value should be registered in profits and losses in the period 
in which they occur. For operations that qualify for hedge accounting, the profits and losses of the hedging 
instruments and the hedged instruments are registered simultaneously, and the measurement criterion of the 
hedged position prevails. Regarding disclosure, the list of requirements is already quite demanding, particularly 
regarding derivatives adoption. 
 
 
4. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Given the Portuguese regulatory background described above, and bearing in mind that the European Union has 
been stating its goal of accounting harmonization within the member states since 2000 (through the proposed 
Regulation75, requiring all listed companies to prepare their consolidated financial statements based on IAS), it is 
possible to analyse which companies are already anticipating IAS requirements, especially with respect to 
financial instruments’ disclosure items. Since we are determining if companies are increasing the extent of their 
disclosures, the theoretical background is provided by voluntary disclosure theories. Verrecchia (2001) paper 
extensively reviews and categorizes theoretical accounting literature on disclosure in order to develop a theory of 
disclosure by companies. He concludes that asymmetry reduction is one potential starting point for a 
comprehensive theory of disclosure. 
 
We argue that there is no single theory of voluntary disclosure. Instead, there are several theories that explain 
voluntary disclosure by companies: agency theory, political costs theory, signalling theory, legitimacy and 
institutional theory, proprietary costs theory and contingency theory. These theories have been widely used in a 
number of empirical studies on the determinants of voluntary disclosure. It has been shown empirically that 
voluntary disclosure is a complex function of several factors: it depends on both firm-specific factors (internal 
factors), and external factors, related to the environmental context of the firm, which include culture, legal 
system, institutional background, among others. Next we review each of these theories and present some recent 
empirical voluntary disclosure studies. 
 
 
                                                 
74 We have followed the 2000 versions of IAS 32 and 39 because these were the versions operative for financial statements in 2001 (the year 
of our empirical study). 
75 Now Regulation 1606/2002. 
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Agency theory 
The positive accounting theory (Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) and Watts and Zimmerman (1978)) 
uses agency arguments (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) to develop studies on the role of financial accounting in 
contractual relationships between managers and shareholders. This theory provides hypotheses for testing in 
empirical studies on accounting method choices and voluntary disclosures. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) state 
that contracting costs (a wide range of costs that include, besides agency costs, other contractual costs, such as 
transactions costs, information costs, renegotiation costs and bankruptcy costs) are crucial to models of 
accounting choice. 
 
According to this theory, accounting information can be seen as the basis for establishing contracts and for 
controlling these contracts.  
It is possible to find several empirical studies of voluntary disclosure that are based on agency arguments. See, 
for example, Cooke (1989), Cooke (1993), Gray, Meek and Roberts (1995),Raffournier (1995), Inchausti (1997), 
Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Eng and Mak (2003). 
 
Political costs theory 
Positive accounting theory also supports the existence of political costs as an explanation for more disclosure. 
Companies that are politically visible and subject to high political costs are expected to disclose more 
information. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that the magnitude of political costs is highly dependent on 
firm size. Size is a proxy variable for political attention. This hypothesis predicts that large firms rather than 
small firms are likely to use accounting choices that reduce reported profits (Watts and Zimmerman (1990)). 
Empirical tests of the relation between political costs and disclosure can be found on Cooke (1989), Raffournier 
(1995) and Inchausti (1997). 
 
Signalling theory 
The signalling theory argues that the existence of information asymmetry can also be taken as a reason for good 
companies to use financial information to send signals to the market (Ross (1977)). Information disclosed by 
managers to the market reduces information asymmetry and is interpreted as a good signal by the market. 
A complementary perspective is derived by Morris (1987), who concludes that combining the agency theory and 
the signalling theory provides a good theoretical background for studies in accounting policy choices, with 
specific reference to voluntary disclosures. 
 
Empirically, several studies have studied signalling influence on disclosure: Inchausti (1997), Raffournier 
(1995), Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002). 
 
Proprietary costs theory  
The proprietary costs theory considers the costs of disclosures as well as its benefits. Managers take into account 
the costs of disclosing information and do not disclose when costs outweigh the benefits. These costs include not 
only those of preparing and disseminating the information, but also costs of appropriation of the information by 
competitors. Investors know this and do not apply adverse selection. Proprietary cost theory applied to disclosure 
is analytically developed by Verrecchia (1983), Dye and Shyam (2001), Darrough and Stoughton (1990) and 
Wagenhofer (1990). Empirically, Prencipe (2004) applies this theory to explain voluntary disclosures on 
segment reporting. 
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Cost of capital theory 
This theory argues that managers have incentives to provide voluntary disclosure to reduce the information 
asymmetry problem and consequently reduce the firm’s cost of capital. The theoretical background for 
establishing a relation between disclosure and cost of capital can be found on Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) and 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991). For empirical results on the effects of the disclosure on the cost of capital see 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Joos (2000). There are several studies that use cost of capital arguments to 
explain disclosure levels empirically: Cooke (1989), Cooke (1993), Gray, Meek and Roberts (1995), Raffournier 
(1995) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002). 
C
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Legitimacy theory and Institutional theory 
Organizations operate within a social framework of norms, values and taken-for-granted assumptions about what 
constitutes appropriate economic behavior (Oliver (1991)). Conformity with community values and professional 
body requirements are also associated with reporting and disclosure practices. Institutional theory predicts that 
firms adopt structures that are considered legitimate by other firms in their industry/sector, regardless of their 
usefulness as a means of legitimizing their actions. Institutional theory argues that organizations are influenced 
by legal pressures and regulatory requirements to which they tend to conform for reasons of reputation costs 
(Chalmers and Godfrey (2004)). Legitimacy theory has been used to analyse social and environmental 
accounting by companies (Guthrie and Parker (1990)). Institutional theory has been used within public sector 
entities’ studies by Carpenter and Feroz (2001) who provide evidence that institutional theory complements 
economic theory in explaining accounting choice (namely the adoption of professionally endorsed accounting 
innovations) within the public sector. There are several studies that test this theory empirically: Gray, Meek and 
Roberts (1995), Watson, Shrives and Marston (2002) and Chalmers and Godfrey (2004). 
 
Contingency theory 
This approach differs from the ones reviewed above. Contingency theory argues that there are other factors 
besides firm-specific factors that influence disclosure practices. Cultural and institutional environments in which 
firms operate are decisive in determining accounting choices and disclosure practices. This theory takes on 
additional importance in studies on international accounting, that is, in studies that cover several countries and 
study accounting diversity/harmonization among them. Most of the research on cultural influences has relied in 
Hofstede’s framework. 
Some analytical work has been done in this area. Gray (1988) developed hypotheses on the association between 
accounting sub-cultural values and cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede. Fechner and Kilgore (1994) 
developed a model in which economic and cultural factors appear as the moderators in the relationship between 
accounting subculture and accounting practice. Basically, this model is a review of the relationships between the 
variables included in Gray’s model. Doupnik and Salter (1995) developed a model that includes three interacting 
elements which determine accounting practices: external environment, institutional structure and culture. Nobes 
(1998) develops a model of international differences in financial reporting based on the different purposes of 
reporting in each country. The purpose of reporting is determined by the financial system of the country, and 
disclosure items (which are related to the amount of information) are determined by the relative importance of 
outsiders (financers who do not belong to the board of directors, including individual shareholders) compared 
with insiders (financers such as governments, families and banks). In countries where outsiders are important, 
there is a demand for more disclosure. Nobes concludes with an important implication for our research (p.182): 
“In cultural self-sufficient countries with a credit-insider system, again the rule makers should think carefully 
before a generalized introduction of Class A (Anglo-Saxon accounting)” and continues by saying (p. 183): “the 
imposition of Class A might be inappropriate, particularly if done for unlisted companies… It might be better to 
concentrate on making Class A available by removing any legal or economic barriers to its usage”. 
These models that incorporate cultural and other environmental factors have been empirically tested by several 
researchers. Table 2 sums up the above contingency and environment–based models of disclosure practices. 
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Table 2: Contingency and environment-based studies on the determinants of disclosure 
 Factors 
 Cultural  Economic   Equity 
market 
Firm-
specific 
Political/ 
legal system 
Corporate 
governance 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) X   X  X 
Adhikari and Tondkar (1992)  X X    
Zarzeski (1996) X   X   
Archambault and Archambault 
(2003) 
X X  X X  
Gray, Meek and Roberts 
(1995) 
  X    
Roberts and Salter (1999) X  X    
Chen and Jaggi (2000)    X  X 
Gray and Vint (1995) X      
Jaggi and Low (2000) X  X X X  
Hussein (1996) X      
Salter (1998)  X X    
Williams (2004) X X X  X  
 
The hypotheses and the independent variables 
Based on theoretical considerations, on previous empirical research, and on the characteristics of the information 
reported by the sample companies, we have developed the hypotheses described below that relate some firm-
specific characteristics to disclosure practices. All hypotheses are stated in alternative form indicating the 
expected sign of the relationship. 
 
Size 
There are several arguments that can be used to link size to disclosure. As Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue, 
political costs are higher in larger companies. So larger firms are more likely to show higher levels of disclosure 
since it improves confidence and reduces political costs. Secondly, larger firms are supposed to have superior 
information systems. Consequently, additional disclosure is supposedly less costly in larger firms than in smaller 
ones. Moreover, proprietary costs related to competitive disadvantages of additional disclosure (Verrecchia 
(1983)) are smaller as firm size increases.  
 
H1: Larger companies are expected to have higher levels of disclosure than smaller firms 
Industry 
The relationship between industry and disclosure can be explained by the political costs theory. Watts and 
Zimmerman argue that industry membership (being related to size) is related to political costs. Proprietary costs 
also vary according to industry. 
 
Additionally, companies in the same industry have interest in producing the same level of disclosure as the other 
companies in the same industry in order to avoid being negatively appreciated by the market (competitive 
pressures). This argument is in line with the signalling theory. 
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Legitimacy and institutional theory can also support this hypothesis because some industries have higher 
institutional pressures than others. 
 
H2: Disclosure practices are predicted to be related to the industry in which the company operates 
Auditor Type 
Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) argue that to maintain their reputation and avoid reputation costs, high profile 
auditing firms are more likely to demand high levels of disclosure of their clients. Dumontier and Raffournier 
(1998) observe that, in their own interest and for the sake of their reputation, auditors want their clients to 
comply with complex accounting standards. 
This is also linked to the fact that major international auditing firms have greater knowledge about International 
Standards and so the costs of implementing and auditing them in their clients is lower than for smaller auditing 
companies. 
Auditing is argued to be a way of reducing agency costs (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Watts and Zimmerman 
(1983)) and so firms that have high agency costs tend to contract high quality auditing firms. 
 
H3: The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher in companies audited by the Big 5 auditors than in 
companies with non-Big 5 auditors 
Listing Status 
The relationship between the firm’s listing status and disclosure practices is based on the agency cost and the 
signalling arguments. Companies listed on multiple or foreign stock exchanges have greater agency problems. 
Higher disclosure reduces shareholders’ monitoring costs. Additionally, in general, foreign investors are 
unfamiliar with national standards and so internationally listed companies tend to comply with international 
standards so that their accounts are understood by the majority of potential investors76.  
 Companies expect that compliance with IAS and high disclosure levels are interpreted as good signals by the 
market and so could be a means of obtaining cheaper capital. This argument is even stronger if the company 
wants to raise its capital in foreign markets (capital-need hypothesis, Cooke (1989)). 
 
H4: The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher in companies listed on foreign exchanges than in 
companies listed on only one (its national) stock exchange 
Multinationality 
This hypothesis is linked to the last one. The more internationalised a company is the more it has to show its 
stakeholders (customers, suppliers, government) that it is a good company. Even a company that is not listed 
internationally may have an interest in showing good levels of disclosure if it has international operations. 
Cooke (1989) also argues that companies operating in more than one geographical area tend to have better 
managerial control systems because of the greater complexity of their operations. So, they are expected to have 
higher levels of disclosure. 
 
H5: The degree disclosure is predicted to increase with a company’s degree of internationalisation  
                                                 
76 Many stock exchanges around the world allow foreign companies to prepare their financial statements according to IAS (see IASB site). 
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Shareholder/creditor relationship 
As higher leverage levels suggest higher agency costs (potential wealth transfers from debtholders to 
shareholders and managers), compliance with international standards and good disclosure levels can be used to 
reduce agency costs and information asymmetries77.  
 
H6: The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher in companies with higher leverage 
Importance of shareholders 
The greater the importance of equity the greater the information needs of shareholders and the monitoring costs. 
So the argument is the same as the one for the agency costs reducing, given above. 
 
H7: The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher the more the company relies on equity markets 
 
 
5. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This study has three main broad research questions: 
Do theories on disclosure and accounting choice apply to the Portuguese listed companies? 
Which factors most influence disclosure practices in Portuguese companies? 
What will 2005 really mean for Portuguese companies? 
Based on these broad questions, our immediate research goals are: 
- to identify the most important factors associated with the level of financial instrument disclosures and, 
- to identify the characteristics of companies that are closest to IAS 32 and 39 requirements. 
Next, we describe how we constructed and measured the dependent variable, the proxies for the independent 
variables, the sample collecting process and the sample’s main characteristics. 
 
5.1. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
Aiming at identifying disclosure practices concerning financial instruments, we applied the content analysis 
technique to listed companies’ annual reports, which were comprehensively analysed. This analysis is based on a 
list of categories that covers all the items which help us to identify the existence and content of disclosures 
required by IAS 32 and IAS 39. 
 
Based on the list of categories used in the content analysis of annual reports, we constructed a disclosure index. 
This index has eleven main categories of information, which are then subdivided into 54 items. The main 
categories are designated as follows: (1) Accounting policies (7 items); (2) Fair values and market values (9 
items); (3) Securitisation and repurchase agreements (5 items); (4) Derivatives: Accounting policies (5 items); 
(5) Derivatives: Risks (4 items); (6) Derivatives: Hedging (10 items); (7) Derivatives: Fair value (4 items); (8) 
Interest rate risk (2 items); (9) Credit risk (3 items); (10) Collateral (2 items); (11) Other (3 items). The detailed 
components of this index are described in Appendix I. 
 
                                                 
77 There are authors who argue exactly the opposite (Zarzeski (1996)) because it is assumed that companies with high leverage ratios belong 
to bank-oriented financial systems where capital markets are not seen as a primary capital source, and information about companies is more 
private than public. This argument, however, does not take the public debt into account. 
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The construction of the index follows the literature on related areas. The index has three main characteristics. It 
is (1) dichotomous, (2) unweighted, and (3) adjusted for non-applicable items. These characteristics are now 
analysed more carefully and our choices considered based on the literature. 
 
 Dichotomous 
A score of one is assigned to an item if it is disclosed (disclosure index) and a score of zero otherwise (see 
Appendix I). The total score for a company is: 
∑
=
=
m
i
idT
1
 
where di is 1 if item i is disclosed and 0 otherwise; m is the maximum number of items (54). 
 
Unweighted 
The total score is calculated as the unweighted sum of the score in each item. The implied assumption is that 
each item is equally important for all user groups. We are conscious that this assumption may be wrong, but we 
think that the resulting bias is smaller than the one that would result from attributing subjective weights to each 
item. Support for this can be found in Robbins and Austin (1986)78. Other empirical studies that use the same 
procedure are Cooke (1989) and Cooke (1993), Meek and Roberts (1995), Raffournier (1995), Inchausti (1997) 
and Chalmers and Godfrey (2004). 
 
Adjusted for non-applicable items 
In assigning the score for each item, the applicability of the item to each company is taken into account. That is, 
we consider that a company should not be penalized if an item is not relevant. This procedure observed 
maximum caution79. We read the entire annual report and if there is no mention of a specific item, we assume 
that it is not relevant. So a maximum score for each company is calculated as follows: 
∑
=
=
n
i
idM
1
 
where di is the disclosure item, and n is the number of items applicable to that company (n is smaller than 54). 
Then an adjusted index is calculated as T/M. This adjustment procedure for non-applicable items is found in 
most of the empirical studies reviewed (Cooke (1989) and Cooke (1993), Meek and Roberts (1995), Raffournier 
(1995) and Inchausti (1997)). 
                                                 
78 They found that (p. 412-413) “the independent variables which were significantly associated with the simple index of disclosure (consists 
only of the extent of disclosure) quality were also significantly associated with the compound index (the product of the extent and relative 
importance of financial disclosure index)”. 
79 We are aware of the subjectivity that can be introduced by this procedure.  Regarding the type of instruments and transactions, which are 
quite new and unknown for some of the sample companies, we believe that by not adjusting for non-applicable items we would introduce a 
bigger result bias. This situation is the opposite of what we find on Chalmers and Godfrey (2004). There, firms not using derivatives and 
making no disclosure are considered as non-disclosing firms. The reason is that it is assumed that the majority of firms would be using 
derivative instruments based on a previous survey. 
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5.2. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
According to our hypotheses, the independent variables are size, industry, auditor type, listing status, 
multinationality, shareholder/creditor relationship and importance of shareholders. Table 3 describes the proxies 
for measuring these variables. 
 
Table 3: Variables proxies 
Variables Variables proxies  
Size Total assets 
Total sales 
Tassets 
Tsales 
Industry 1 dummy variable ind1: Financial (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
Auditor type 1 dummy variable d_aud: Big 5/Non Big 5 (1= yes; 0 = no) 
Listing status 1 dummy variable  
 
d_list: listed on one stock exchange or 
not (multilisting) (1= yes; 0=no) 
Multinationality Sales outside Portugal/ Total sales Mult 
Shareholders/creditors Debt/Equity DE 
Shareholders Market value/ Total assets MV 
 
Sample selection and characteristics  
Our sample includes all companies listed on Euronext Lisbon on the 31st December 200180. At the end of 2001, 
there were 56 quoted companies in Portugal. One company did not publish an annual report in 2001 and so it 
was excluded from the sample. Hence, the final sample comprises 55 companies, of which 29% are from the 
industrial sector and 20% from the financial sector. 
 
 
6. RESULTS 
 
Descriptive statistics       
Table 4 reports the overall means and standard deviations for the dependent variable – the adjusted disclosure 
index (Idisc_a) and for each of its categories. The range of scores for the disclosure index varies from 16% to 
64%. 
                                                 
80 We chose the year 2001 because it is the year that IAS 39 became effective and it is the last year for which annual reports had been 
published when we started the research. 
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Table 4: Dependent variable 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std Deviation 
Idisc a ,16 ,641 ,44 ,09 
Disclosure index category     
(1) Accounting policies ,000 1,000 ,804 ,120 
(2) Fair values and market values ,000 ,500 ,054 ,129 
(3) Securitisation ,400 ,800 ,600 ,126 
(4) Derivatives – Accounting policies ,000 1,000 ,590 ,334 
(5) Derivatives – Risks ,000 1,000 ,535 ,323 
(6) Derivatives - Hedging ,000 1,000 ,401 ,250 
(7) Derivatives – Fair value ,000 ,500 ,171 ,221 
(8) Interest rate risk ,000 1,000 ,345 ,270 
(9) Credit risk ,000 1,000 ,067 ,207 
(10) Collateral ,000 1,000 ,491 ,402 
(11) Other ,000 1,000 ,494 ,101 
 
Analysing Table 4, we conclude that the best area in terms of closeness degree to IAS is the accounting policies 
adopted item (non-derivative and derivative financial instruments). The worst areas in terms of degree of 
closeness to IAS are the items fair/market values (non-derivative and derivative financial instruments), hedging 
related items, interest rate risk and credit risk item. The next table shows the mean of the index of disclosure by 
economic sector, by type of auditor and by listing status. 
 
Table 5: Dependent variable means by economic sector, auditor type and listing status 
 Disclosure index 
Economic sector Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Basic materials ,435 ,038 
Consumer, cyclical ,422 ,071 
Consumer, non-
cyclical ,465 ,101 
Financial ,446 ,156 
Industrial ,440 ,081 
Technology ,471 ,048 
Telecommunications ,394 ,071  
 Disclosure index 
Auditor Type Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Non- big five auditor ,399 ,085 
Big five auditor ,451 ,091 
Listing Status   
One or more foreign 
stock exchange ,537 ,056 
Portuguese stock 
exchange ,429 ,089 
 
 
 
 
Multivariate results 
We tested all hypotheses, entering all independent variables at once in the model, and tested several functional 
forms. Three independent variables prove to be statistically significant: Size (measured either as Tassets - model 
1 or Tsales - model 2), listing status and leverage degree (measured by D/E). The sign of the coefficients for 
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Tassets and Tsales follows our expectation and suggests that larger firms show higher levels of disclosure. The 
coefficient of D_list also confirms our hypothesis that companies listed on more than one exchange have higher 
disclosure. Firms with higher leverage degree also proved to have a higher level of disclosure. In sum, our results 
confirm three hypotheses: H1, H4 and H6.  The results of the regression do not support a type of industry (H2), a 
type of auditor (H3), an internationality degree (H5) and a shareholder importance (H7) effect. 
 
Table 6: Regression results  
Independent variable Model 1 
Coefficient 
(Prob.) 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
(Prob.) 
TASSETS 2.55E-07 
(0.0200) 
 
TSALES  3.22E-06 
(0.0178) 
IND1 -0.100311 
(0.1150) 
-0.098237 
(0.1083) 
D_AUD 0.019097 
(0.4579) 
0.017414 
(0.4971) 
D_LIST -0.070751 
(0.0146) 
-0.061794 
(0.0501) 
MULT -4.36E-05 
(0.9195) 
-6.51E-05 
(0.8796) 
DE 0.009964 
(0.0443) 
0.009725 
(0.0451) 
MV 0.000341 
(0.2877) 
0.000349 
(0.2781) 
 R-squared: 0.282646 R-squared: 0.291226 
Note: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
 
 
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In order to identify the determinants of disclosure by the Portuguese listed companies, we constructed an index 
of disclosure issues, which comprises 54 items related to financial instruments. The components of the index are 
based on IAS 32 and 39 disclosures. This type of analysis allows the characteristics of the firms that are closest 
to IAS requirements to be analysed, considering the mandatory adoption of those standards after 2005.  
The findings yield interesting results. We conclude that disclosure level is significantly related to size, listing 
status and leverage degree. As expected, the results show a positive relation to size and leverage degree. When it 
comes to listing status, the results confirm that companies listed on more than one exchange show higher 
disclosure level. Overall, we conclude that larger companies, higher leverage companies and companies listed on 
more than one exchange market present higher levels of disclosure regarding their financial instrument adoption, 
meaning that they are closer to the IAS 32 and 39 requirements. The other independent variables were found to 
have no significant relationship with the disclosure level. Our sectoral dummy variable that distinguishes 
financial companies from non-financial ones was not found to be significant. The same was true of the 
hypothesis that related disclosure level to the importance of shareholders, measured by the ratio of market 
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capitalization to the total assets. The degree of multinationality, measured by the ratio of sales to international 
markets to total sales, does not influence a company’s degree of disclosure.  
These results suggest that the voluntary disclosure theories, originated in developed capital markets probably do 
not apply fully to Portugal, where there is a quite large degree of family ownership and bank-oriented financing 
policies. We argue that the agency theory, the signalling theory and the political costs theory cannot be 
completely applied in the Portuguese context. The influence of size may be explained more by other reasons, 
related to the proprietary costs of disclosure (larger firms have lower proprietary costs for information 
disclosure), than by agency reasons. We think therefore that the inclusion of other variables, which emphasized 
characteristics specific to Portuguese companies and Portuguese managers, in the context of other theoretical 
frameworks, namely, contingency theory, could bring some new insights to this study.   
There are some limitations inherent to this study.  First, there is the problem of the sample size. This problem, 
which is intrinsic to Portuguese capital market size, restricts our hypotheses testing by means of linear regression 
models. Another limitation results from the index construction process. We were very careful with the scoring 
process, but errors may have occurred. Furthermore, annual reports are not the only means by which companies 
disclose financial instruments. But we think that it is the most important one. 
The next phase of this research will extend the study to other European countries in order to ascertain and 
compare the degree of financial instrument disclosure in other countries that are going to be affected by the 2005 
accounting regulation. The determination of accounting practices in a multi-country sample, allowing the 
inclusion of explicative factors based on contingency theory, should lead to more productive conclusions. 
CITIES IN COMPETITION 
 154 
Appendix I–Components of the disclosure index 
Disclosure Index   
Accounting Policies Derivatives – Hedging 
Held for trading securities Hedging description 
Held-to-maturity securities Accounting method 
Loans and receivables originated by the 
enterprise 
Financial instruments designated as hedging instruments 
Available-for-sale financial assets Fair values 
Held-for-trading liabilities  Nature of the risks being hedged 
Other financial liabilities Future transactions hedging 
Trade date vs Settlement date The period in which forecasted transactions are expected 
to occur 
Fair values and market values The period they are expected to enter in income 
Measurement method Cash-flow hedging 
Significant assumptions The amount recognised in equity 
Fair value changes in Available-for-sale 
financial assets 
The amount removed from equity and recognised in 
income 
Amount recognised in equity  The amount removed from equity and added to initial 
measurement of the acquisition cost 
Amount removed from equity Derivatives – Fair value 
Unability of reliability in measurement Fair value 
Financial assets description Method adopted 
Their carrying amount Significant assumptions 
Explanation of the reason Average fair value during the year 
Range of estimates within which the fair 
value is likely to lie 
Interest rate risk 
Securitisation and repurchase 
agreements 
Future changes in interest rates 
Accounting policy Maturity dates 
Nature and extent Credit risk 
Collateral Counterparties identification 
Whether the financial assets have been 
derecognised 
Maximum amount of credit risk exposure 
Information about the key assumptions 
used in calculating the fair value of new 
and retained interests 
Significant concentration of credit risk 
Derivatives – Accounting policies Collateral 
Risk management policy, including 
hedging policy 
Terms and conditions 
Objectives of holding or issuing derivatives Carrying amount and fair value 
Accounting policies and methods adopted Other 
Monitoring and controlling policy Impairment losses 
Financial controls Total interest income and total interest expense 
(separately) 
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Derivatives – Risks In AFS, realized and unrealized gains/losses (separately) 
Segregation by risk categories  
Principal, stated value, face value, notional 
value 
 
Maturity  
Weighted average/effective interest rate  
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